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ABSTRACT: This article addresses the development of the political culture in Iran
after the end of international sanctions. This depends on Iran’s internal socio-economic
development and domestic political life as well as on the international relations of the
country. In this framework, the realisation of the JCPOA is also relevant. The election
of the Parliament and the Assembly of Experts in February and April 2016 were very
important for the years to come. In the parliamentary election, the reformists and the
moderates close to President Rouhani won 140 out of 290 seats. This means that the
Parliament is balanced in the sense that negotiations between different political forces
are needed in order to realise any of the reforms planned by the reformists. This results
in progression in the political culture because a new kind of dialogue becomes neces-
sary. Iran’s international relations also have an important impact on the country’s po-
litical culture. They determine how much Iran can open itself up to the world. Two
dimensions are essential here: firstly, the civil war in Syria and relations with Saudi
Arabia; and, secondly, the outcome of the nuclear deal and the ending of the sanctions.
Iran supports the regime of Bashar al-Assad, believing that if it is toppled, it will be
replaced by extremist groups such as Islamic State and/or Jabhat al-Nusrah, which
might cause the dismantling of the country and the destabilisation of the whole security
architecture in the region. Similar issues concern relations with Saudi Arabia, which,
in reality, does not so much indicate Shi‘a-Sunni antagonism, but rather competition
between the two dominant regional powers.
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this article studies the general tendencies of the politicaldevelopment in Iran and asks to what degree the removal ofsanctions leads to a signiﬁcant development in Iranian political
culture and a new phase in Iran’s international environment. 
e development of Iran’s political culture is diﬃcult to predict. as
such, we need to understand the country’s historical realities and to
analyse its internal political processes. however, understanding Iran’s
socio-economic development is even more important. e emergence
of a new political culture can be seen in the interconnection of the
domestic and international spheres. 
e Joint comprehensive Plan of action ( JcPoa) on the Iranian
nuclear programme was reached in mid-July 2015 in vienna. In mid-
January 2016, the International atomic energy agency (Iaea)
published its report stating that Iran had respected all the requirements
of the agreement. is opened the door for the liing of the sanctions1.
During the six months from the nuclear agreement until mid-January
2016 many things changed rather dramatically, including things that
will have an impact on Iranian – and regional – opportunities to truly
beneﬁt from the end of sanctions. is period ended with the Iranian
elections at the end of february 2016. President hassan Rouhani’s
reformist camp was successful in the parliamentary elections in the whole
country, but in the election of the assembly of experts2, the reformist
camp won only in teheran. nationally, most of the seats in the assembly
of experts still belong to the conservatives close to the Supreme leader
ayatollah Khamenei.
While this six-month period saw many important, rapid, and
dramatic changes, the whole preceding decade witnessed important,
oen structural changes in Iran and Iranian society, including increasing
urbanisation, demographic development with a new kind of age pyramid,
economic hardship due to international sanctions, and high inﬂation. 
all in all, the perspectives in March 2016 were very diﬀerent from
what they were supposed and expected to be in the middle of the summer
2015 when the nuclear agreement was reached.
ordinary Iranians, especially the youth, have been waiting for
relatively rapid progressive changes in society and particularly for fast
economic growth and increasing national prosperity. ese expectations
1 Information Note on EU sanctions to be lifted under the Joint Comprehensive Plan
of Action ( JcPoa), Brussels, 23 January 2016, https://goo.gl/zzW6ky. La fin
des sanctions va permettre à l’Iran de récupérer ses avoirs gelés, « le Monde.fr avec
afP et aP », Paris, 19 January 2016, https://goo.gl/lnyBKe.
2 this assembly of experts will select the next Supreme leader after the death of
ayatollah ali Khamenei. 
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should be observed in the light of the country’s internal development,
which takes place in its regional and international environment. Speciﬁc
attention should be paid to the economic conditions where these
developments occur. 
Diminishing oil prices and thus much lower oil revenues than were
expected even in the summer of 2015 are having a huge impact on the
entire Iranian economy. furthermore, the uS, and especially its
Republican Party, are trying to hinder and create obstacles to the liing
of the sanctions, which is perceived very negatively by the Iranians and
regarded as a very unfair act. If this kind of behaviour continues, not
only will it negatively inﬂuence Iranian economic development; it will
also have a regrettable impact on Iran’s attitudes towards the outside
world. 
Reduced revenues mean fewer investments and thus slower economic
growth and development. is domestic economic development is very
important and sensitive for the political regime and for the political
power struggle between the three major political factions: the reformists,
the moderates, and the conservatives. 
e elections for the Majlis (the Iranian Parliament) at the end of
february and the complementary round at the end of april 20163 were
won by the reformists of the Rouhani camp. however, due to the results
of the elections for the assembly of experts, they cannot govern without
compromising, for instance, with the diﬀerent elements of the moderate
conservative camp. is means negotiations and political struggle for
most of the reforms President Rouhani and his supporters want to pass
in the Parliament. ey concern domestic policies and civil society, but
also Iran’s opening up to the world and the international community. as
a matter of fact, we can presume that the issue is about how much the
policy-making is based on the population’s expectations and how much
is based on the ideological values of the Islamic Republic of Iran.
In the vicinity of Iran, the international context is also changing
very rapidly, and oen in an unpredictable way. two issues dominate
this environment. e civil war in Syria is having a very negative impact
on all kinds of relations in the entire region. It is an obstacle to any kind
of normal and sane development in any of the ﬁelds. With varying
intensity, Iran is backing assad’s regime in Damascus. Without having
to take a position on this issue, it is obvious that Iran would deﬁnitely be
better oﬀ without the civil war in Syria. from an external point of view
3 Iran elections: Hardliners lose parliament to Rouhani allies, “BBc news”, 30 april
2016, https://goo.gl/i0crrI. 
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and in the long run, this is a burden for Iran’s foreign relations, as it is for
the whole region.
e civil war in Syria is also, at least partly, connected to the
worsening relations Iran has with Saudi arabia, which supports the anti-
assad opposition and its diﬀerent armed groups. at the same time, Saudi
arabia has been trying to build up and lead a kind of arab coalition of
Sunni nations at odds with the Shi‘a world that is supposed to serve
Iran’s interests. Besides the Persian Gulf, this is said to be happening in
the yemeni civil war, where Iran and Saudi arabia back opposite sides.
e sad thing here is that, besides its negative impact on Iran, this rivalry
might somehow result in the whole region losing the opportunity to
beneﬁt from the positive impact of the end of the nuclear controversy
and the liing of the Iranian sanctions. Instead of useless competition,
one might consider how this new evolution could help to resolve the
Syrian catastrophe, as well as the conﬂict in yemen4. 
e entire international community is, of course, aﬀected by the
nuclear agreement and the liing of the sanctions against Iran. e
opening up of the Iranian markets aer almost ten years of sanctions is
of interest to political spheres and the business world globally. e
number of oﬃcial high level delegations and commercial expeditions
visiting Iran is astonishingly important. almost everybody is interested
in getting a share of the market and oﬀering services. In certain ﬁelds of
the Iranian economy and social life, this is particularly important. ese
interests are also bound to more general features in international relations.
e uS and europe have, at least partly, diﬀerent understandings of
their relations with Iran, and Russia is playing its own cards rather
originally with its long-standing support of Iran. Russia’s massive
involvement in Syria since September 2015 and its sudden partial
withdrawal in March 2016 make things unclear. is means that it is
also diﬃcult for Iran to predict Russian policy in the region. It has been
argued that the main result of the Russian campaign was to show that
there is no military solution to the Syrian crisis and to bring the
stakeholders back to the negotiation table in Geneva5. 
4 the uS Secretary of State John Kerry invited Iran on 7 april 2016 to help end
the wars in yemen and Syria. It is worth on noting that the uS recognised the im-
portance of Iran in these peace processes just before meeting his counterparts
from the Gulf cooperation council in Bahrain, “al-arabiya–afP”, london,
Paris, 7 april 2016.
5 at the panel Joining Hands for Syria’s Future: Prospects for Cooperation between
the EU and Russia?, university of tampere, 4 april 2016, by Dr. ekaterina Stepa-
nova, Institute of World economy and International Relations, IMeMo, Moscow. 
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all this forms the context in which Iran has been evolving since the
spring of 2016 onwards. Many things are very diﬃcult to foresee, and
we currently lack serious scientiﬁc research and analysis of several diﬀerent
critical ﬁelds. e development of a new Iranian political culture can be
seen in the interconnection of four dimensions: the internal development
in Iran and the three concentric circles constituting the country’s
international relations.
INTERNAL DIMENSIONS IN IRANIAN DEVELOPMENT
Since the revolution in 1979, and especially during the last ten years,
Iran’s political life has been very dynamic. all recent election campaigns
indicate that the bases for popular participation in the political process
exist, and there is also possibly the option for partial political change.
e end of the sanctions and the implementation of JcPoa are having
a signiﬁcant impact on the political atmosphere in Iran, and these have
started a new cycle in the country’s political life. how the local actors
will react to these changes is one of our main research questions.
e whole six-month period between the nuclear agreement in July
2015 and the elections in february and their complementary round at
the end of april 2016 witnessed the preparations for those elections.
Besides the political debate on the main issues that were at stake in the
elections, such as economic reforms and the opening up to the outside
world, the particular character of the Iranian electoral system became
the subject of debate, particularly the so-called Guardian council of 12
members, which vets all candidates for President, Parliament (Majlis),
and the assembly of experts, and states if the candidates are qualiﬁed to
run or not. 
apparently, there seems to be increasing pressure to reform or even
to get rid of this system of disqualifying electoral candidates. In august
2015, President hassan Rouhani stated that there is no place in Iran for
disqualifying qualiﬁed persons who want to serve their country based
on their political faction6. e Supreme leader ali Khamenei did not
favour this approach. nevertheless, during the electoral campaign,
President Rouhani tried to make it more diﬃcult for the Guardian
council to reject reformist and moderate candidates. concerning the
assembly of experts, this issue has been continued by the discussion of
the criteria that the next Supreme leader should fulﬁl, the conservatives
6 Shahir Shahidsaless, The road to choosing Iran’s new leader, “Middle east eye”, 26
December 2015, https://goo.gl/uDjfRr. 
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trying to add new criteria to those mentioned in the country’s
constitution7.
In the 26 february 2016 Majlis elections, the Guardian council
approved only 4,700 candidates of an original 12,000. In the case of the
assembly of experts, only 161 were accepted out of 800 candidates.
ere were very few reformists among those selected8. It is obvious that
this question of vetting candidates and disqualifying an important
number of them will be an issue for political debate in the future of Iran
for years to come and a challenge for all the political stakeholders. e
country certainly needs a lot of creativity and imagination in order to
overcome this dilemma while respecting the values of the Republic. is
is already a sign of a new political culture in the making.
e 26 february 2016 Majlis and assembly of experts elections
were a success as such for the Islamic Republic of Iran. ey were peaceful
and without serious incident. e turnout was about 62%, which is more
or less the same –  even a little higher – than previously9. is shows
that, in fact, most people have understood that their votes will be counted
and will have an eﬀect. for the assembly of experts, which has 88
members, ali akbar hashemi Rafsanjani and Mohammed Khatami’s
list, both former presidents and close to hassan Rouhani, won about
50% of the members, all of whom belong to the moderate camp.
concerning the Majlis, the moderates won almost half of the seats,
altogether 140 out of 290 seats, which is a remarkable result. however,
their number is not enough to govern alone, especially if they want to
realise political, economic, and social reforms or to have an open foreign
policy10. 
for this reason, the time is ripe for a profound and accurate
assessment of the performance of all three camps –  the reformists,
moderates, and conservatives – and it would be better for the reformists
not to become euphoric about their victory. Instead, they should
7 Ibidem.
8 Ghazal Golshiri & louis Imbert, Le succès diplomatique ne renforce pas M. Rohani,
« le Monde », Paris, 19 January 2016, https://goo.gl/vfaumJ. louis Imbert
(propos recueillis par), Ayatollah Youssef Saanei ‘Où sont les actes de Hassan Rohani?’,
« le Monde », Paris, 27-28 february 2016.
9 Elections en Iran : premiers résultats encourageants pour les réformistes, «le Monde.fr
avec afP, aP et Reuters  », 27 february 2016 at 14:34, updated 28 february
2016 at 07:46, https://goo.gl/1BKgtf, https://goo.gl/9gRV6R, and
https://goo.gl/QRO4gD.
10 hassan Beheshtipour, Lessons and Opportunities Resulting from Iran’s Elections, in
“Iran Review”, teheran, friday, March 4, 2016, https://goo.gl/DxKeKo.
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understand the current conditions in Iran and realise the need for
cooperation in the new parliament in order to solve the people’s problems.
is is especially true because the new Parliament will need
cooperation between all factions in order to start parliamentary
interaction in the post-JcPoa era. If all the factions manage to engage
in constructive interaction, they will be able to provide strong support
for the presidential administration in its bid to promote constructive
interaction with the world, without having any concern of being accused
of dependence on foreign powers.
at present, unlike in the past, reformists and moderates know that
the conservatives are an undeniable reality in Iranian society, and this
might facilitate the political power game and also result into more
balanced relations between diﬀerent political camps and more realistic
expectations for the future.
e second political issue in the 2016 elections dealt with the
challenges of the economic reforms and the opening up of the country
to the world. It also concerned the content of the nuclear agreement
and the meaning of economic relations aer the end of the sanctions.
one of the big questions asked was what kind of cultural impact this
opening up to the world would have. In practice, this question refers to
how much control and limitation there should be concerning the Internet,
for instance. is is an important issue in Iran, where the population is
very young.
from a demographic perspective, Iran is a youthful country: about
half of Iran’s 80 million inhabitants are under 35 years old, and the
median age in Iran is 30.1 years11. In Iran, the youth is the largest part of
the population compared to any other country in the world, with 35%
of the population aged between 15 and 29 years. is fact is at least
partly due to the baby boom in the early 1980s aer the Islamic
Revolution. is high percentage of youth will start to reduce from 2020
onwards12. 
is large, youthful population means several particularities in social,
economic, and political life. from 2008, due to global crises and sanctions,
the diﬃcult economic situation and its negative impacts on ordinary
people started to increase. In the same year, demographic pressures also
became more important. is especially concerned the Iranian youth,
particularly those from lower income families. is group is still suﬀering
the most from inﬂation and international isolation.
11 Worldometers, 2016, https://goo.gl/WgoQw2.
12 Djavad Salehi-Isfahani, Iranian Youth in Times of Economic Crisis, in “Iranian Stu-
dies”, 2011, vol. 44, no. 6.
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In Iran, the youth forms 60% of the electorate and young people
played a crucial role in the election of President Mohammed Khatami
already in 1997 and again in 2001. In 2009, the youth questioned the
results of the elections. today, it is said that the Iranian youth is more
interested in social and cultural ﬁelds than in politics13. In this, the
Iranian youth is following a global tendency where there is a kind of
disinterest and disappointment in politics, but this might be only
temporary and we should expect that the youth in Iran will play a major
role in the country’s new political culture in the future. 
e Iranian youth is well educated: universities and other higher
education establishments enrol an increasing number of students. today,
students number some 4.5-5 million young people14. It is also worthy of
note that about 60% of higher education students are female15.
nevertheless, even good quality education is not solving most of the
diﬃculties young people face in Iran.
Perhaps the two most important challenges the Iranian youth faces
today are employment and marriage – that is, being able to start a family.
ese two items somehow determine many other issues in young people’s
social and individual lives within Iranian society. ese phenomena also
result in something known as “waithood”16, which means that young
people must wait increasing periods of time – sometimes several years –
before ﬁlling a job vacancy aer completing their studies and before
forming a relationship.
e general unemployment rate in Iran is high: it is about 11%
oﬃcially, but in reality it is estimated to be at least 30%17. among the
youth, even oﬃcial ﬁgures are much higher: about 25% of young males
and 46% of young females are unemployed. for those young people who
have a university degree or diploma, unemployment is an even more
serious problem. although varying very much across diﬀerent ﬁelds, it
13 https://goo.gl/3hSGuq, and https://goo.gl/WnDwvu.
14 valentine ayse, Jason John nash, Rice leland ( January 2013), “The Business Year
2013: Iran”, london, uK: the Business year: 162, and Over 350,000 Iranians
studying abroad: Education Minister, “teheran times”, 9 January 2014,
https://goo.gl/01thGf, and https://goo.gl/0e1zQl. today the number of Iranians
studying abroad is about half a million.  
15 florence Beaugé, Les Iraniennes ne désarment pas, « le Monde Diplomatique »,
no. 743, 63è année, Paris, february 2016, and https://goo.gl/QPt9Rb.
16 navtej Dhillon & tarek yousef (eds.), Generation in Waiting: The Unfulfilled
Promise of Young People in the Middle East, Brookings Institution Press, Washin-
gton, Dc, 2009.
17 florence Beaugé, Un pays grippe, « le Monde Diplomatique », no. 743, 63e an-
née, Paris, february 2016. according to some sources, the official rate of unem-
ployment is about 19%.
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can be about 30% for men and more than 50% for women in some
cases18. 
one of the reactions to unemployment has been young higher
educated Iranians leaving the country for the Persian Gulf countries,
europe, north america, and australia. In all, aer the 1979 Revolution,
the Iranian diaspora consists of about 5 million people, and those with
an academic education form an important part of it19. today, aer the
end of sanctions, they seem to have started returning to Iran, hoping, of
course, that they can restart their life in their own country20. 
the question of forming a couple and starting a family is an important
issue in all north african and Middle eastern societies, and this is the
case in Iran also. the debate on the marriage market is certainly very
serious, but at the same time a little amusing. all the savant calculations
on different age tranches and suitable spouses seem a little too “statistical”
in their rigid categorisation. for our understanding, besides “true love
for ever”, the question of employment – that is the possibility to sustain
a family – and housing – that is where to live with the family – are
essential. If young people cannot form a couple, or need to wait
excessively long to do so, this is a real and unfair problem for the whole
society. In Iran, there is relatively a lot of discussion on the unbalance
between the sexes and the lack of males – there is about a 25% deficit at
marrying age21. however, there still seems to be surprisingly little
discussion on housing concerning this issue compared to other countries
in the Middle east and north africa, where it is an important obstacle
to forming a family22. 
18 nader habibi, Iran’s Overeducation Crisis: Causes and Ramifications, “Middle
east Brief ”, crown center for Middle east Studies, Brandeis university, no. 89,
february 2015, Waltham, Massachusetts, https://goo.gl/JSs1Mf, and tara vi-
shwanath, Ouvrir les portes: égalité des sexes et développement dans la région de
MENA, « afrikar / idées. Revue trimestrielle pour le dialogue entre le Maghreb,
l’espagne et l’europe », no. 48, Winter 2015/2016, estudios de Política exterior
S.a, Madrid & IeMed, Instituto europeo del Mediterráneo, Barcelone.
19 https://goo.gl/R9havu.
20 nader habibi, Iran’s Overeducation Crisis: Causes and Ramifications, “Middle
east Brief ”, crown center for Middle east Studies, Brandeis university, no. 89,
february 2015, Waltham, Massachusetts, https://goo.gl/Ksyc3i, and World Po-
pulation Review 2016.
21 https://goo.gl/lteQrw.
22 Djavad Salehi-Isfahani, Iranian Youth in Times of Economic Crisis, “Iranian Studies”,
vol. 44, no. 6, (2011), https://goo.gl/czfMnK. As a matter of fact, Djavad
Salehi-Isfahani is one of the few scholars to thoroughly describe the
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as stated earlier, the Iranian youth is more interested in their
socioeconomic living conditions and in cultural aﬀairs than in politics.
oen the main issue concerns civil liberties in the domain of culture
and creation, and how much, for instance, the foreign websites and tv
and radio channels are controlled. is might be a false issue in the sense
that in reality it is so easy to bypass all of these restrictions, and young
Iranians are well-educated enough to know how to do it23. Perhaps it
would just be wiser to trust this educated generation of Iranians and
believe that due to their high level of education and attachment to their
own civilisation they can “read” the foreign media critically enough and
analyse its weaknesses and positive contributions. Regardless, in the new
period aer the end of sanctions and the international isolation of Iran,
the youth of Iran will be fully integrated into the global society, at least
in the medium term. 
e attachment of the Iranian youth to their own civilisation has
been seen, for instance, in the way how they have appropriated the
traditional cultural events such as norooz (nowruz) or even diﬀerent
religious holidays by creating their own manners of celebration. also of
note is the richness of Iranian cinema and ﬁlm production, the large
number of daily newspapers (400) as well as the country’s remarkable
eﬀorts in translating foreign literature, one of the greatest in the world24.
It is more than obvious that this kind of cultural landscape means
that the Iranian youth and young people should be taken very seriously
into account by the political regime and political leaders. economic
reforms might require the reduction of the Revolutionary Guards’ role
in the country’s economy. Still, it seems that the conservatives have no
intention of giving up their power in the economic ﬁeld. conservatives
are afraid that economic openness brings with it Western cultural
penetration, especially for the younger generations. Khamenei at least
partly shares this view, and this remains a real dilemma for the regime.
During the 2016 election campaign, President hassan Rouhani
promised “a better future” for young Iranians and this is something he
and the country should take very seriously and try to accomplish. e
new Iranian political culture will most probably be a combination of
patterns of the Iranian marriage market and the difficulties the youth has
in forming a relationship.
23 https://goo.gl/Mtt2uW.
24 erik nyström & Kambiz Ghafouri, Kansan valitsema presidentti, “uP-ulkopoli-
tiikka”, no. 1, helsinki, 2016, and esmaeil haddadian-Moghaddam, Literary
Translation in Modern Iran: A sociological study, “Benjamins translation library”,
no. 114, Ku leuven, John Benjamins Publishing co., 2014,
https://goo.gl/wQghpP, as well as https://goo.gl/RpeiWM.
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the expectations of the young people and the ongoing result of the
political factions’ power struggle in the context of the new international
environment. 
IRAN’S IMMEDIATE VICINITY
ere are three principal circles in the international relations of
Iran. e immediate neighbours in the Persian Gulf constitute the ﬁrst
set of partners. Relations here are extremely important but very diﬃcult.
In the Persian Gulf, the six arab countries of the Gulf cooperation
council each have an individual approach towards Iran, which diﬀers
from their common opinion within the council. 
of course, the relations of Iran with the arab countries in the Persian
Gulf are today very dependent of the attitude of Saudi arabia, which is
trying to dominate the whole Sunni Islam part of the arab world, if not
wider. In practice, this situation might be more complex, especially when
we take into consideration that many Persian Gulf partners have a long
peaceful history with Iran and that they have no interest in any kind of
animosity in the near future. 
e neighbours to the north and east of Iran – azerbaijan, armenia,
turkmenistan, afghanistan and Pakistan – are important, but perhaps
less problematic than those of the Persian Gulf. two of them
– afghanistan and Pakistan – may be the most crucial. afghanistan is,
of course, problematic because of the security situation in the country.
as for Pakistan, it is notable that there are millions of Pakistani workers
in Saudi arabia and the Persian Gulf countries. Still, Pakistan did not
accept a request from Saudi arabia to send troops to yemen. aer the
end of sanctions in 2016, the construction works for the Iran-Pakistan
gas pipeline, which were started in 2010 and later interrupted, have
resumed. ere is competition between diﬀerent regional actors, with
India and china participating in the construction of harbours in Iran
and Pakistan. Pakistan has also tried to mediate between Iran and Saudi
arabia25.
In more general terms, we can presume that the nearby vicinity of
Iran is certainly not without problems, but at the same time, being
realistic, these countries are looking, at least partly, for positive relations
with Iran. Some of the Persian Gulf countries have a kind of Iranophobia
that is accentuated by the attitude of Saudi arabia. e development of
the crises in Syria and Iraq will, most probably, have an impact on their
25 Jean-luc Racine, Le Pakistan cherche sa place dans une région tourmentée, « le
Monde Diplomatique », no. 744, 63e année, Paris, March 2016.
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attitudes. is takes place, of course, in the more general context of the
international relations in the Middle east. 
It is not oen noticed, but Iran has one of the largest refugee
populations in the world. e country oﬃcially hosts more than three
million refugees, mostly from Iraq and afghanistan; the number from
Syria is not known26.
MIDDLE EAST
e second circle of Iran’s foreign relations consists of the arab
countries in general plus turkey. is is the most diﬃcult element for
Iran. here, the development of a positive approach is crucial, and it does
not depend solely on the Iranians; for instance, Saudi arabia and Bahrain
play also an important role. of course, this second circle overlaps with
the ﬁrst one concerning the Persian Gulf, but it includes the whole of
the Middle east.
is domain is marked by two sets of problems. e ﬁrst set consists
of the civil war in Syria and the internal situation in Iraq as well as the
crisis in yemen. Iran is involved in all of these conﬂicts. We need to
analyse how the end of the sanctions will aﬀect these contexts and impact
both the internal development and the external relations of Iran.
It is clear that the civil war in Syria is the most diﬃcult issue for
Iran. aer the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988), in which europe and the
uSa supported Saddam hussein’s Iraq, it is not at all surprising that
Iran remains extremely hesitant and suspicious concerning all the security
challenges that are taking place in the country’s vicinity.
e war in Syria is damaging all kind of diﬀerent relations and
developments across the Middle east. It has become clear for all parties,
especially aer Russia joined the war in September 2015, that there is
no military solution; military action can only support the political
process27.
In the war in Syria, there seems to be diﬀerent attitudes and a whole
variety of opinions concerning Iran’s participation and strategic goals.
Some studies estimate that Iran is, since March 2016, following the
Russian example and reducing its engagement in Syria. ayatollah youssef
Saanei has even publicly criticised the country’s military presence in
Syria. ose who are close to the conservatives and especially Iran’s
Revolutionary Guards corps strongly support the Iranian presence in
26 World Population Review, 2016.
27 cécile hennion & Madjid zerrouky (interviewers), Jean-Marie Guéhenno, L’Etat
islamique et Al-Qaida ne seront pas vaincu de l’extérieur, “le Monde”, Paris, 10-11
april 2016.
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Syria, saying that if they do not ﬁght the violent jihadists – Islamic State
and Jabhat al-nusra – today in Syria, they will have to face them at home
in about ﬁve years28. Iran is also afraid that if the assad regime is toppled,
Syria will share the destiny of libya and the battle between diﬀerent
radical entities will dominate the Syrian scene. Iran is also afraid that the
assad regime could be replaced by a government with closer ties to Israel
and thus drastically change its security environment.
e fragile cease-ﬁre in february 2016, the partial withdrawal of
Russia, and the participation of Iran in the Syrian peace talks might
contribute to a situation where the Syrian stakeholders are more eager
to start a political process that might lead to a more sustainable solution.
for Iran, participation in the peace talks might consolidate a political
culture that values dialogue and mediation in solving social issues.
In the vicinity of Iran, a second set of problems concerns relations
with Saudi arabia and the whole Shi‘a-Sunni confrontation, which is,
in some degree, artiﬁcial – or at least ideological, overemphasised, and
exaggerated – because as it is so old, it cannot serve anything other than
contemporary political passions. as a matter of fact, this Shi‘a-Sunni
confrontation is a ﬁg leaf, camouﬂage for the regional power struggle
taking place between Iran and Saudi arabia29.
historically, Saudi arabia and Iran were competing partners, and
their “cooperation” mainly served both countries’ domestic and foreign
policy goals. In the 1970s, during the hot years of the cold War, the
Western alliance (nato) referred to Saudi arabia and Iran as the “twin
pillars” in the region.
e 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran changed all this, however, and
Iran grew ever more isolated in both the Middle eastern and international
spheres. In this context, Iran increasingly emphasised relations with
diﬀerent Shi‘a minorities, especially in Iraq and in lebanon, where she
supported hezbollah. is support was justiﬁed as the desire to help
the Palestinians and all those who fought the Israeli occupation of
southern lebanon. In Iraq, the support aimed to bolster the Shi‘a majority
neglected by Saddam hussein’s regime. 
It is diﬃcult to estimate how serious the claims are of Iran’s wish to
form a kind of “Shi‘a empire” and expand its zone of inﬂuence. ese
28 louis Imbert (interviewer), ayatollah youssef Saanei ‘Où sont les actes de Hassan
Rohani ?’, « le Monde », Paris, 27-28 february 2016, and louis Imbert, Les Ira-
niens unis face à la guerre en Syrie, « le Monde », Paris, 13-14 March 2016.
29 ari Kerkkänen, Syyria ja lähi-itä. Havaintoja nykypäivästä ja heijastuksia historiasta,
“Pystykorvakirja”, Suomen Rauhanpuolustajat & like, Riika, helsinki, 2015. Be-
sides theological and religious differences, it is obvious that there is also a clear hi-
storical issue between the Sunni and Shi‘a that explains today’s controversy.
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kind of pretensions have been present since the Islamic Revolution. Still,
as many specialists have stated, the evidence of history show us that there
has not been an attempt to form an Iranian empire since the pre-Islamic
Sassanid empire. today, it seems that Iran has neither the will nor the
capacities for an empire. furthermore, the country’s military expenditures
are far behind those of the other Persian Gulf states30.
e so-called arab spring, the civil war in Syria and the new attitude
of the uS towards Iran have resulted in a situation where Saudi arabia
has been seeking a leadership role in the Sunni world and has created an
arab coalition to intervene in the Syrian civil war, one which is ﬁghting
Islamic State but also backing some anti-assad forces. e relations
between Iran and Saudi arabia deteriorated drastically in early 2016
aer the execution of a Shi‘a religious scholar by Saudi arabia and the
retaliatory sacking of the Saudi embassy in teheran. Diplomatic relations
between the two countries were frozen, and the situation remains
extremely worrying as there are very few signs of detente.
Without delving too deeply into the details we can, of course, ask:
Is the Iranian regime really trying to solve this problem? If Saudi arabia
and other arab countries are reluctant, can europe or the international
community help them to accept a resolution to this impasse? is is a
very important question because so many stakeholders in the international
community are putting much too much emphasis on this Iran-Saudi
arabia dichotomy today. once again, outside actors can play a role, but
only by taking into consideration the local forces and accompanying
political processes. It is certainly a domestic issue for Iran and for the
country’s new political culture in the making. In the case of Saudi arabia
and the diﬃculties it faces – for instance with the war in yemen – there
is a possibility to clearly demark where the limits of military adventure
and attempts to dominate lie by reducing arms delivery31 .
e role of turkey also remains a question mark for Iran. Besides
the Syrian civil war, the issue of the diﬀering ambitions of the Kurds
30 Riccardo alcaro, The West and the Middle East After the Iran Nuclear Deal, “IaI
Working Papers 15/25”, IaI, Istituto affari Internazionali, Rome, July 2015.
When the Muslim arabs invaded Iran during the Sassanid empire, they had not
yet expanded to the Roman and later to Muslim empire in andalusia and north
africa. according to the definition of empire in political science, the concept
and the principle of the Shi‘a empire in the current state of global and regional
issues in the Middle east is virtually impossible.
31 Rouzbeh Parsi, The Middle East and the Deal: In Search of a New Balance, in
Paolo Magri & annalisa Perteghella (ed.), “Iran after the Deal: the Road ahead”,
ISPI (Italian Institute for International Political Studies), edizioni epoké, Milano,
2015.
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might be a problem. is is something which seems to change every six
months. e foreign policy of Recep tayyip erdogan has become
increasingly diﬃcult to foresee as the regime has become more
authoritarian. on the one hand, Syria remains an issue between turkey
and Iran, and the Kurds’ interests might lead to the issue becoming even
more serious. on the other hand, turkey is challenging Saudi arabia as
the leading Sunni power. is might align it closer to Iran’s position.
In some way, we could hope that in the medium term, the whole
region will enter a new era where the positive elements of the arab
Spring and the end of sanctions against Iran prevail.
THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
as for the third circle of Iran’s foreign relations, the development of
the whole international community will have a multiform impact on
the country aer the end of the sanctions. If the implementation of
JcPoa is done correctly, it will impact the overall relations in the
international context and contribute positively to the solution of the
ongoing diﬃculties. It is obvious that this will inﬂuence Iranian internal
development and, in the long run, Iranian political culture. e
interaction of these three foreign relation circles with the internal
development of Iran will determine the country’s future in the coming
decades. 
aer the end of the sanctions, two issues are becoming crucial for
Iran’s development. e ﬁrst is – as already stated – the implementation
of JcPoa and its economic options. e second concerns world politics
more generally, in particular the impact of relations between Russia and
the uS, and the role of china and the BRIcS32.
In the ﬁrst issue, the progressive liing of the sanctions started 16
January 2016. is meant the release of the Iranian ﬁnancial assets in
international banks. ere are diﬀerent estimations of their worth starting
from 32 billion uS dollars33, but the ﬁgure could be very much higher
in a rather short period of time, up to 100 milliard uS dollars. e
SWIft code was re-established on 3 february 2016 at nine international
banks, making ﬁnancial transactions possible. e process of liing the
sanctions has diﬀerent eﬀects in europe and the uS: some political
circles (right-wing Republicans) in the uS are trying to hinder the liing
of the international sanctions. furthermore, in the uS many unilateral
sanctions still remain in place and new ones are being created because of
32 BRIcS: the “emerging countries” of Brazil, Russia, India, china, and South africa.
33 La fin des sanctions va permettre à l’Iran de récupérer ses avoirs gelés, « le Monde.fr
avec afP et aP », Paris, 19 January 2016, https://goo.gl/idQfX5.
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Iranian human rights policy and the issue of ballistic missiles. Many
european and international banks are hesitant to start business with
Iran as the uS treasury has the possibility of pursuing them legally34.
In this new situation, Iran is looking for foreign investments and
hoping her own oil and gas incomes will increase. e ﬂuctuating and
the eventual low level of the price of oil on the world market has cut
Iranian incomes by half compared to the calculations made in July 2015.
is has, of course, a negative impact on the expectations of rapid growth
and prosperity by the population. today Iran produces about 2.8 million
barrels a day, and the goal is to increase daily production by half a million
barrels.
Since the second half of 2015, but especially aer the end of
sanctions, an important number of foreign oﬃcial and commercial
delegations have visited Iran. President hassan Rouhani himself visited
Italy and france at the end of January 2016. e German vice-chancellor
Sigmar Gabriel was the ﬁrst european minister and chinese president
Xi Jinping the ﬁrst foreign head of state to visit Iran following the nuclear
agreement. a number of important treaties were signed during these
visits. chinese commerce is expected to grow tenfold in the coming
decade. france has signed contracts worth about 15 milliard euros, while
those signed by Italy are worth 17 milliard euros. e french energy
giant total, airbus, PSa Peugeot citroën, and Paris airport are among
those who signed large, long-term contracts35. Similar agreements will
be signed with austria, Switzerland, and Spain in the coming months.
Iran’s Supreme leader ali Khamenei has stated this spring that uS
companies can also participate in Iranian tenders, but added that several
political issues will be considered beforehand. obviously, this can be
seen as an oﬀer to negotiate. 
e implementation and careful respect of JcPoa is of great
importance to Iranians. If Iranians do what is required by the agreement,
they naturally presume that the international community will do the
same. is is important for the prestige of the regime and also for
common Iranians in terms of national pride, and perhaps even more for
the economic dimensions of everyday life. 
34 louis Imbert, L’“eldorado” iranien peine à voir le jour, « le Monde », Paris, 26
april 2016.
35 James M. Dorsay, China & the Middle East: Tilting Towards Iran?, “RSIS com-
mentary”, no. 20/2016, 28 January 2016, RSiS, S. Rajaratman School of Interna-
tional Studies, nanyang technological university, Singapore, 2016, and Visite 
d’Hassan Rohani à Paris: des contrats à profusion, «  economie  », RfI, Radio
france Internationale, 29 January 2016, as well as Italy and Iran Cooperation Agree-
ment, “Bridgewest”, lawyersItaly.eu, 3 february 2016, https://goo.gl/fpKo8a.
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aer 37 years of diﬃculties, the nuclear deal is a golden opportunity,
and this is a kind of test case for the model of an organised agreement. If
executed well, it will very positively aﬀect substantial international
agreements regarding other political matters. 
as a matter of fact, this dilemma largely surpasses the case of Iran. It
concerns the whole credibility of the international community and the
prestige of the un Security council: the world needs to trust the
agreements that are concluded by the “major players”. here, the visit of
Barak obama to cuba has some importance, as it shows the world that
the unhappy politics of sanctions can be overcome.
from an Iranian point of view, international relations at large consist
of the roles played by uSa and Russia, primarily in the Middle east.
Russia’s intervention in Syria at the end of September 2015 and its
surprise withdrawal in March 2016 made Russia perhaps the most
important foreign player in the Syrian and Middle eastern context.
Russia backing for the assad regime and the uSa arming and training
the opposition is a kind of proxy war between the two, but this is a very
dangerous and cynical game in which uS prestige in the Middle east
and the Russian proﬁle on the international stage are at the stake. Russia
is clearly hoping to ﬁnd a fresh start aer the failures of ukraine and the
crimea, and the country seems to have succeeded only very partially.
e uS hopes to maintain its inﬂuence without investing too heavily.
e nuclear agreement with Iran is very important for the uS and it
must somehow succeed to balance this agreement with the dissatisfaction
of the unhappy arab states.
a diﬀerent kind of military cooperation and arms delivery becomes
very problematic in this scenario, and europe has more or less the same
kind of dilemma. Some of the european countries are very keen to restart
relations with Iran, both politically and economically. at the same time,
they must try to satisfy their partners such as Saudi arabia, some of the
Persian Gulf emirates, and egypt with important arms deliveries and
direct military cooperation without compromising relations with Iran,
which are, in the long run, very important. is arms trade is very
problematic: despite the cease-ﬁre, the uS is arming Syrian rebels and
Russia is delivering a modern anti-aircra defence system to Iran36.
e nuclear agreement between Iran and the international
community is irreversible, since it involves the interests of both parties.
even if the future uS president is a Republican, he/she will most likely
implement JcPoa. failure to do so would alienate the uS’s allies in
36 louis Imbert, La Russie livrerait des missiles S-300 à l’Iran, « le Monde », Paris,
13 april 2016.
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europe and asia. It would also provoke irritation in Iran and most
importantly, it would isolate the supporters of opening up the country
to the world. 
ultimately, the question is about the nuances concerning the
attitudes europe, the uS, and Russia have towards Iran on the one hand
and towards Middle eastern crises more generally – Syria, yemen, Saudi
arabia as well as libya and egypt – on the other. ere are also new
actors, such as the BRIcS and especially china. Both Iran and china
are eager to develop bilateral cooperation, not only in economic ﬁelds
but also in the military and political domains, as shown during the visit
of President Xi Jinping.
If all the stakeholders – Iran, local actors, and international partners
– are really interested in beneﬁtting from the nuclear agreement and the
end of sanctions, they should seriously and collectively try to address
the main problems of the regions mentioned above. is requires
cooperation, moderation, and ﬂexibility. It will take time and will have
to be established step by step. however, it also means that the new
political culture in Iran –  which will be based on the interests of the
majority of the Iranians – is just the beginning. It should be extended to
the whole region from cairo to teheran. In a way, this political process
could be compared with the european reconstruction era aer the Second
World War. let us hope that it does not lead to a new cold War, but to
a new political culture, one more positive for Iran and for the whole
region.
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